COMMENTS
Waiving Chevron
Jeremy D. Rozansky†
By according agencies the power to interpret the law, Chevron deference increases the power of administrative agencies. Yet agencies may not always want the
benefits of Chevron deference. If the agency is a party in a lawsuit, it might decide
not to seek Chevron deference in the hope that the court will reverse its binding policy.
Following the inauguration of President Donald Trump, the Federal Communications
Commission did just that in Global Tel*Link Inc v FCC, a lawsuit concerning regulations of calling services at correctional facilities. At least initially, the DC Circuit did
not apply the Chevron framework because the agency did not seek it. This Comment
looks at the novel issue raised by Global Tel*Link—namely, Chevron waiver, the
idea that an agency’s decision not to seek deference can prevent the application of
the Chevron framework.
Chevron waiver can appear in many forms: a failure to raise or a disclaimer
of a right to deference could waive Chevron. Sometimes the agency itself waives, and
sometimes another official has litigating authority. Different agencies may have litigating authority, and a failure to make arguments at any of the Chevron framework’s steps could amount to Chevron waiver. Moreover, there are many possible
motivations for the policy reversal, from new technical conclusions, to interest group
lobbying, to intra-administration conflicts, to the post–presidential transition reversal in Global Tel*Link.
As a possible new threshold inquiry before the Chevron framework is applied,
Chevron waiver would inhere at Chevron Step Zero. But the doctrinal formulations
of Step Zero neither prescribe, imply, nor prohibit the possibility of Chevron waiver.
Instead, this Comment looks to a series of rationales that the Supreme Court, when
justifying Chevron deference or giving shape to Step Zero, has ascribed to a hypothetical reasonable Congress. Though the rationales made explicit in the Step Zero
cases—expertise and agency accountability—do not strongly suggest a resolution to
the question of Chevron waiver, a third rationale does. The reasonable Congress
wants agency policy change to be channeled through rigorous procedures. Such procedures—like notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication—help ensure that the agency actually wrestles with technical arguments, more fully deliberates, alerts Congress and interested individuals to a pending action, works with
elected officials, and provides a basic opportunity for individual participation in the
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decision-making. Because Chevron waiver is a means of circumventing these rigorous procedures, this Comment urges courts to apply the Chevron framework when
it is warranted despite the fact that an agency does not seek it.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc1 has been a boon for federal agencies. The decision created “Chevron deference,” which gives agencies considerable leeway to interpret statutes. Under Chevron’s
two-step formula, courts will defer to an agency interpretation if
(Step One) the statute is ambiguous and (Step Two) the interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”2 So
long as the agency selects a meaning that could reasonably be
taken from (frequently opaque) statutory language, the agency’s
interpretation will stand. In effect, Chevron adds the interpretive
power—the power “to say what the law is”—to the litany of other
agency powers.3
Yet from time to time, agencies may want to shed their interpretive power and not seek Chevron deference, a move I call
“Chevron waiver.” This can be done by stipulating to the court
1

467 US 837 (1984).
Id at 843.
3
See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 188–89 (2006). Professor
Cass Sunstein calls Chevron a “counter-Marbury for the administrative state.” Id at 189.
See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
2
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that the agency no longer wishes to defend its interpretation or
does not claim Chevron deference. An agency may choose to waive
Chevron for any number of reasons. Perhaps new information has
come to light. Maybe the agency is under pressure from an engaged and intense lobby. Or maybe, after a presidential transition, new agency leadership wants to reverse the previous administration’s policy. The latter occurred in 2017. Global Tel*Link v
Federal Communications Commission4 concerned caps on the
rates charged by prison inmate–calling services imposed by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) during the Obama
administration. In the wake of President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the FCC declined to defend its interpretation and seek
Chevron deference. A panel of the DC Circuit respected the
agency’s position and did not apply the familiar two-step framework despite the presence of an intervenor arguing for deference.5
Six weeks later, however, the panel had second thoughts and
amended its opinion. The revised opinion held that the Obama
FCC’s interpretation was unreasonable all along and would
therefore fail Chevron’s second step, so the court did not need to
reach the issue of what to do when the agency does not seek Chevron
deference.6
This case illustrates that not all Chevron questions have been
answered. In particular, judges have not grappled with Chevron
waiver—a question that goes to the heart of why Chevron deference exists. Each of the three judges on the panel wrote separately about Chevron waiver, but not one cited an authority. Instead, the judges resorted to conclusory statements that Chevron
deference “would make no sense”7 or “would be inappropriate”
when the agency does not seek deference.8 The panel retreated to
intuition rather than relying on authority because, in fact, there
was no authority to cite.
If permitted, there is good reason to think that agencies will
make periodic use of Chevron waiver, especially in an age in
which administrative powers are increasingly used as partisan
weapons.9 But should agencies be allowed to waive Chevron? This

4

866 F3d 397 (DC Cir 2017).
Id at 402, 407–08.
6
Id at 417.
7
Id at 408.
8
Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 418 (Silberman concurring).
9
See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy
Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L J 1671 (2012).
5
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Comment explores the law behind the DC Circuit’s intuitions and
rejects the court’s initial conclusion that waiver should be allowed.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I describes the
unique circumstances of Global Tel*Link and generalizes to describe how an agency can waive Chevron and the set of circumstances that could lead to Chevron waiver. Chevron waiver would
act as another element of Chevron’s Step Zero, the inquiry into
whether the Chevron framework should be applied. This Comment
therefore evaluates Chevron waiver as a Step Zero question.
Part II looks to the case law formulating Chevron Step Zero, but
the standard doctrinal formulations for Step Zero address only
when an agency is entitled to deference and shed little light on
whether that deference is mandatory. Hence, Part III examines
the Chevron waiver question not from Step Zero’s doctrinal formulations but from the principles working beneath the surface of
the Step Zero cases. Specifically, the Supreme Court’s Step Zero
cases consider why a hypothetical reasonable Congress intended
its statute’s ambiguities to be resolved by the agency. The reasons
for Chevron deference—agency expertise, accountability, and rigorous agency procedures—all help determine when Chevron applies.
As Part III discusses, the particular risk of Chevron waiver is that
it allows the agency to circumvent the rigorous and accountabilityenhancing, policy-formulating procedures set up by Congress.
Given that overriding concern, this Comment urges a prohibition
on Chevron waiver.
I. THE ANATOMY OF CHEVRON WAIVER
The Chevron doctrine increases the power of agencies.10 Under Chevron, courts defer to the agency that administers the statute. The obvious question is why an agency would ever want a
reviewing court to give greater scrutiny to its interpretations, lessening its power. This Part argues that there are common scenarios in which an agency can be expected to want to waive Chevron
and that, if courts recognize the power to waive Chevron, agencies
will add Chevron waiver to their policymaking toolkit. First, this
Part describes Global Tel*Link, in which the issue of Chevron
waiver came before the DC Circuit as a matter of first impression.

10 See Kent Barnett and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116
Mich L Rev 1, 30–31 (2017) (observing that agencies won 77 percent of the circuit court
cases in which the panel applied Chevron deference but less than 54 percent of the cases
in which it did not).
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Part I.B then discusses how an agency can go about waiving
Chevron. Finally, Part I.C describes the common conditions under
which an agency will want to waive Chevron and why, if Chevron
waiver is permitted, it could become a feature of administrative
practice.
A. Global Tel*Link: Chevron Waiver in a Case of First
Impression
Section 276 of the Communications Act11 empowers the FCC
to “promote the widespread deployment of payphone services to
the benefit of the general public.”12 The statutory definition of
payphone services includes what the industry terms “inmate telephone service[s]” offered in correctional institutions.13 The Act
directs the FCC to “take all actions necessary . . . to prescribe regulations that establish a per call compensation plan to ensure
that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for
each and every completed . . . interstate call.”14 Rates for inmate
calling services were historically left unregulated by the FCC.15
Inmates face significantly higher calling rates than they
would at a public payphone. Before the first federal rate caps were
introduced, inmates in some states paid as much as $17.30 for a
fifteen-minute long-distance collect call.16 One reason rates are so
high is that service providers compete for contracts at correctional
facilities, often by bidding up site commissions, the shares of revenue that go to the correctional facility.17 Rates are also higher
inside prisons and jails because of security concerns. Texas, for
instance, requires providers to integrate voice biometric screening.18 Of course, higher calling rates limit an inmate’s ability to
contact family members and attorneys.19

11 Relevant sections added in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104104, 110 Stat 56, codified in various sections of Title 47.
12 47 USC § 276(b)(1).
13 47 USC § 276(d).
14 47 USC § 276(b)(1).
15 See Report and Order, In the Matter of Policies and Rules Concerning Operator
Service Providers, 6 FCC Rec 2744, 2752 (1991).
16 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 28 FCC Rec 14107, 14126 (2013) (“2013 ICS
Order”).
17 Id at 14129.
18 See Joint Brief for ICS Carrier Petitioners, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications
Commission, No 15-1461, *5 (DC Cir filed Nov 14, 2016) (“Providers’ Brief”).
19 See 2013 ICS Order at 14130 (cited in note 16).
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After lobbying from the families of inmates, the FCC decided
to regulate inmate calling services. Following a 2012 notice of proposed rulemaking and comments from interested parties, the
FCC adopted interim rate caps for inmates’ interstate calls in
2013.20 Several parties, including inmate calling–service providers, challenged the 2013 order in the DC Circuit, which granted a
partial stay of the regulation and subsequently held the case in
abeyance as the FCC began a second round of rulemaking on inmate calling services.21
The new order—promulgated in 2015 after traditional noticeand-comment rulemaking and challenged in Global Tel*Link—
adopted tiered rate caps, with more stringent caps reflecting the
lower cost associated with providing service at larger correctional
facilities.22 The rate caps were formulated without factoring in the
cost of site commissions, in the hope that the regulation would
trigger change-of-law clauses in inmate calling–service contracts;
renegotiations between providers and facilities; and a new, site
commission–free market norm.23 Most dramatically, the FCC
claimed authority over intrastate inmate calls, applying the rate
caps to intrastate calls.24 The regulation was promulgated with
all three Democratic appointees voting in favor and the two
Republican-appointed
commissioners
dissenting.
ThenCommissioner Ajit Pai challenged the majority’s reading of the
organic statute’s requirement that providers be “fairly compensated.”25 The language comes from the Telecommunications Act of
1996,26 which was Congress’s response to the monopoly that dominated the telecom industry. Pai reasoned that, given this context,
Congress was concerned with service rates that, because of subsi-

20

See id at 14147.
See Order, Securus Technologies, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, No 131280 (DC Cir filed Jan 13, 2014); Order, Securus Technologies, Inc v Federal Communications
Commission, No 13-1280 (DC Cir filed Dec 6, 2014).
22 Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 80 Fed Reg 79136, 79137 (2015)
(“2015 Order”).
23 See id at 79154 (“[W]e conclude that our actions in this Order constitute changes
in law and/or instances of force majeure that are likely to alter or trigger the renegotiation
of many ICS contracts.”).
24 Id at 79139.
25 Second Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In
the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 30 FCC Rec 12763, 12961–65
(2015).
26 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified as amended in various sections of Title 47.
21
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dies or discriminatory conduct, were “too low to ensure fair compensation,” not too high.27 In addition, Pai explained the source of
the FCC’s plenary rate-setting authority was not the specific payphone provision in § 276 but rather § 201 of the Communications
Act, which limited the authority to interstate and international
service.28
Global Tel*Link originated in several providers’ petitions for
judicial review of the 2015 order. The providers challenged the
2015 order on a number of grounds, including that the rate caps
were arbitrary and capricious and that the FCC had exceeded its
statutory authority.29
Presidential politics transformed a run-of-the-mill case about
agency authority and allegedly heavy-handed regulations into a
case about whether an agency could waive its considerable discretion under Chevron. Global Tel*Link was fully briefed in November
2016, just days after Donald Trump was elected president.30 The
FCC’s five-member board is appointed by the president, with, customarily, three members representing the president’s party and
two representing the other party.31 The vote on inmate calling–
service rate caps followed party lines, so a shift in the partisan
makeup of the FCC signaled a likely shift in the Commission’s
position on the rate caps.
Argument was scheduled for February 6, 2017. Anticipating
a shift in the Commission’s position, on January 11, 2017, the DC
Circuit asked the parties to “show cause” for not holding the case
in abeyance as the Commission turned over.32 Commissioner Jessica

27

In the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 30 FCC Rec at 12961–62.
Id at 12960.
29 See Providers’ Brief at *17–18 (cited in note 18).
30 The final reply brief was filed on November 14, 2016, six days after the presidential election. See generally Joint Reply Brief for the ICS Carrier Petitioners, Global
Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461 (DC Cir filed Nov 14, 2016).
31 The statute prevents the president from appointing more than three commissioners from his own party. See 47 USC § 154(b)(5). Customarily, the chairman resigns at the
beginning of each new administration, allowing the president to appoint a member of his
own party as chairman and giving the president’s party a majority. See Margaret Harding
McGill and Alex Byers, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler to Resign (Politico, Dec 15, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/B5VW-JF2X.
32 See Order, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461,
*1 (DC Cir filed Jan 11, 2017).
28
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Rosenworcel’s term expired on January 3 (she has since been renominated and confirmed33), and Chairman Tom Wheeler, following custom, was to resign effective January 20.34 By January 21,
the two dissenters from the 2015 order would constitute a majority of the three active commissioners. Yet the DC Circuit panel
determined that arguments should go ahead as scheduled.35 The
Obama administration argued that relief for inmate families had
been delayed long enough.36 The administration was probably
also keen to keep the case before the assembled panel, which included two Democratic appointees and only one Republican,
Judge Laurence Silberman. Silberman dissented from the court’s
decision to hold arguments as scheduled, preferring to give the FCC
a sixty-day window to determine whether it would revisit the
2015 order.37 He also noted that, eight years earlier, a similar luxury had been afforded to the incoming Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), giving the Obama administration time to determine if it wanted to rescind a Bush-era rule.38
Three days after Inauguration Day, Pai was designated FCC
Chairman. The majority of the Commission now held the position
that the FCC did not possess statutory authority to promulgate
intrastate rate caps for inmates.39 The majority soon directed the
FCC’s counsel to abandon the argument contained in the first section of its brief: that the FCC had authority to cap intrastate
rates.40 In addition, the FCC abandoned the argument that it lawfully considered industry-wide average costs when it set the rate
caps, a practice the industry lawyers had argued was contrary to
33 See Jessica Rosenworcel: Commissioner (Federal Communications Commission),
archived at http://perma.cc/NJH7-8GMK.
34 See Letter, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461,
*1 (DC Cir filed Jan 31, 2017) (“Jan 31 Letter”).
35 Order, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, *1
(DC Cir filed Jan 18, 2017) (“Jan 18 Order”).
36 Response of the Respondents to Show Cause Why These Cases Should Not Be
Placed in Abeyance, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461,
*3 (DC Cir filed Jan 17, 2017). As so often happens, the two sides switched positions on
procedural issues as the political upper hand shifted. The government had successfully
argued for an abeyance of the litigation over the 2013 ICS order as the FCC considered
comments that eventually led to the 2015 order. See Joint Response of Petitioners Global
Tel*Link Corp. and Centurylink Public Communications, Inc. to Order to Show Cause,
Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, *2–3 (DC Cir filed
Jan 17, 2017).
37 Jan 18 Order at *2 (cited in note 35) (Silberman dissenting).
38 Id, citing California v Environmental Protection Agency, No 08-1178 (DC Cir, Feb
25, 2009).
39 Jan 31 Letter at *1 (cited in note 34).
40 Id.
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the statute.41 Because of the change in its argument, the FCC
ceded ten minutes of its time to intervenors representing families
of inmates.42 The intervenors were permitted to argue for the 2015
order in its entirety.43
Each retracted section of the brief concerned the agency’s interpretation of the text of the Communications Act. The section
concerning intrastate rates explicitly cited Chevron, while the
section concerning average costs cited a case that applied Chevron
to support deference to the agency’s line drawing.44 The intervenors’ brief largely left these Chevron arguments to the agency.
Their oral advocate began his argument by pointing to a footnote
in the intervenors’ brief that he said incorporated the Chevron
arguments.45 His brief only touched on Chevron, the advocate
said, because the FCC had briefed the issue and he was following
instructions “not to file repetitive briefs.”46 None of the judges immediately pushed back against the intervenors’ claim that its
briefing of the Chevron issue was “more than adequate.”47 Later
in the appearance, Silberman pressed the intervenors’ advocate
about whether Chevron arguments had been abandoned, and the
advocate insisted that the agency had to promulgate its new policy through the usual means.48
Judge Harry T. Edwards, writing for the majority, interpreted
the agency’s abandonment of the statutory interpretation arguments as waiving Chevron deference altogether. Though agency
promulgations carrying the force of law are “presumptively” subject to Chevron review, the presumption was overcome by the
agency’s decision to abandon its interpretation.49 It would simply
“make no sense” to apply Chevron to a position the agency has

41 Id at *1–2. See Brief for Respondents, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications
Commission, No 15-1461, *48 (DC Cir filed Nov 10, 2016) (“FCC Brief”).
42 Jan 31 Letter at *2 (cited in note 34).
43 Id.
44 FCC Brief at *32, 39, 49 (cited in note 41).
45 Oral Argument, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 151461, 1:00:56–1:01:51 (DC Cir Feb 6, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4SZW-SS5H, referencing Final Brief of Intervenors Ulandis Forte, et al (the “Wright Petitioners”), Global
Tel*Link, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, *23 n 106 (DC Cir filed
Nov 11, 2016). The footnote cited by the intervenors did not reference Chevron by name
but did reference statutory interpretation arguments in the FCC’s 2013 order.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id at 1:15:38–1:16:25.
49 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 407.

1936

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1927

abandoned.50 Without Chevron deference, the court invalidated
both the intrastate rates and the use of industry-wide averages.51
Each of the other judges on the panel offered his or her own answer to whether an agency abandoning its statutory interpretation
argument constituted a waiver of Chevron deference. Silberman
joined Edwards’s opinion and wrote separately to say that, even
granting Chevron deference, the order exceeded the agency’s powers.52 Because Silberman would have refused to approve the order
even under a deferential review, he did not need to comment on
whether Chevron had been waived. Yet Silberman explicitly endorsed Edwards’s view of Chevron waiver, writing, “I especially
agree that Chevron deference would be inappropriate in these unusual circumstances.”53 Judge Nina Pillard dissented.54 In her
view, the court should look at the agency’s interpretation of the
statute when it promulgated the rule and take no heed of a postpromulgation attempt to waive Chevron.55 She then instructed
the new FCC majority that, if it wanted to change the rule, the
statute gave it the “latitude to do so” through notice-and-comment
rulemaking.56 Not only did none of the judges cite an authority for
their conclusions about what to do when an agency abandons its
statutory interpretation argument,57 none of them engaged with
the extensive academic literature and case law on what Chevron
is, how it is justified, and when it applies. Edwards cited the conclusion in United States v Mead Corp58 that Chevron applies to
agency determinations having the force of law but then posited—
without reasoning—a Chevron waiver exception.59 Pillard hinted
at a concern that the agency was doing an end run around notice
and comment but gave no reason why such a concern should be
decisive.60

50

Id at 408.
Id at 407–08, 412.
52 Id at 418 (Silberman concurring).
53 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 418 (Silberman concurring).
54 Id at 419 (Pillard dissenting).
55 See id at 420 (asserting that “the question for us is whether the FCC’s view when
it promulgated the challenged rule . . . was a permissible construction of the statute”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
56 Id.
57 See note 73 for examples of cases in which an agency did not pursue Chevron arguments but, unlike in Global Tel*Link, had no intent to change policy by doing so.
58 533 US 218 (2001).
59 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 407–08.
60 Id at 425 (Pillard dissenting).
51
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Seven weeks later, the panel retreated from its apparent
holding that the FCC could waive Chevron deference.61 Edwards
and Silberman joined an order amending and purportedly clarifying the decision. Edwards now embraced Silberman’s view that
the FCC’s extension of authority over intrastate rates would fail
Chevron’s second step and clarified that the use of industry-wide
averages was arbitrary and capricious (rather than outside the
bounds of the statute).62 Because each agency action was impermissible even assuming Chevron deference, the majority did not
need to reach the question of whether the agency waived Chevron
and whether that would be permissible.63
The “Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion”
was more amendment than clarification. The original opinion
quite clearly endorsed the possibility of Chevron waiver, but the
majority, perhaps spooked by the intervenors’ en banc petition,
which charged the court with creating a “dangerous loophole [for
agencies] to evade judicial review,”64 attempted to read its endorsement of Chevron waiver out of the opinion.65 Despite the evident shift in its approach to Chevron waiver, the majority
claimed it was simply clarifying “any confusion” and recovering a
“point” that may have been “lost.”66 If we take the panel at its
word, it never held that Chevron waiver was either permissible or
impermissible. It remains an open question whether the original
decision’s straightforward allowance of Chevron waiver will have
any precedential value.
B. Defining Chevron Waiver
Even if the initial holding in Global Tel*Link was superseded
by the Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion, it is
61

Id at 416 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion).
Id at 417.
63 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 417 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority
Opinion) (“We need not and do not decide whether we were required to follow Chevron . . .
even though the agency declined to defend its position before the court.”).
64 Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Global Tel*Link, Inc v Federal Communications
Commission, No 15-1461, *8 (DC Cir filed July 28, 2017). Note that the intervenors’ objection is nonsensical. Chevron waiver necessarily gives more opportunity for judicial review
because, with Chevron waived, judges need not defer to agency interpretations. Chevron
waiver is, therefore, not a loophole allowing the agency to evade judicial review. If it is a
“dangerous loophole” to anything, Chevron waiver is a means of evading formal agency
decision-making procedures. See Part III.D.
65 See Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 417 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority
Opinion).
66 Id.
62
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still worth examining that holding. The majority reasoned that “it
would make no sense for this court to determine whether the disputed agency positions advanced in the Order warrant Chevron
deference when the agency has abandoned those positions.”67
That holding poses the question of why it would “make no sense.”
To understand the rationale, we need to know whether Chevron
arguments were sufficiently presented. If not, it would be possible
to understand the opinion as rooted in the norm against judges
raising issues the parties have not presented.68 But if the arguments were presented, then Global Tel*Link is best read as adding a threshold question before the Chevron analysis.69 Under
that reading, courts would need to ask whether the agency seeks
deference. Only if the agency seeks deference can deference be
given.
From the facts of Global Tel*Link, there are reasons to think
the court rested its decision on some grounds other than the norm
against judicial issue creation. The industry parties who opposed
the order certainly briefed the statutory interpretation issue.70
The FCC retracted its counterarguments, but the intervenors
may have incorporated them in a footnote that referenced similar
arguments in a previous FCC order.71 Moreover, at oral argument,
the intervenors offered reasons for thinking that the Chevron issue had been presented to the court. In its opinion, the majority
did not attempt to rebut the intervenors’ arguments. If the intervenors failed to sufficiently present Chevron arguments, the
panel did not say so.
If the majority decided Global Tel*Link on judicial issuecreation grounds, the decision as a whole would not say anything
remarkable about Chevron. Courts frequently rely on parties’
choices not to brief Chevron arguments.72 However, aside from

67

Id at 408.
For a survey of judicial practice when arguments are not raised, see Amanda
Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L J 447, 462–64 (2009) (observing a general norm
against courts raising issues sua sponte, with many significant exceptions for issues of
subject matter jurisdiction, standing, federalism and comity constraints, preclusion, abstention, sovereign immunity, and what she calls “exceptional” “merits issues”).
69 Professor Aaron Nielson has interpreted the DC Circuit as adopting this view. See
Aaron Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review—Reviewed: A New Step for Chevron? (Yale J Reg: Notice
& Comment, June 16, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S683-46K2.
70 See Providers’ Brief at *40–47 (cited in note 18).
71 See notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
72 For examples of cases in which a private party failed to brief or intentionally abandoned Chevron, see Lubow v US Department of State, 783 F3d 877, 884 (DC Cir 2015)
68
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Global Tel*Link, the cases in which courts have relied on an
agency’s choice not to brief Chevron arguments are all cases in
which the agency merely opted not to waste pages on unpersuasive or spurious arguments.73 Perhaps the norm against judicial
issue creation should operate differently when the agency’s litigating position reflects a policy choice and not a mere decision to
prioritize its best arguments.74 But that is only a suggestion. The
rules and customs surrounding whether judges will raise issues
sua sponte are a vast and confounding topic that lies adjacent to
this Comment.

(finding it unnecessary to rule on Chevron’s first step “because the plaintiffs make no argument that the statute unambiguously compels their interpretation”); Albanil v Coast 2
Coast, Inc, 444 Fed Appx 788, 796 (5th Cir 2011) (withholding Chevron deference because
a plaintiff failed to raise it before the district court).
73 For examples of cases in which the agency did not seek deference, see SSC Mystic
Operating Co, LLC v National Labor Relations Board, 801 F3d 302, 316–18 (DC Cir 2015)
(Srinivasan concurring) (speculating that deference was not sought in Laurel Baye
Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc v National Labor Relations Board, 564 F3d 469 (DC Cir
2009), because the Board plausibly did not believe it had the authority to undertake jurisdictional interpretations); MBIA Insurance Corp v Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, 708
F3d 234, 240 (DC Cir 2013) (noting that the FDIC was not seeking deference, presumably
because it had not promulgated a regulation interpreting the statute); Lawson v FMR
LLC, 670 F3d 61, 82 (1st Cir 2012) (explaining that the agency correctly stipulated that
no deference was merited); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co, a Division of ONEOK, Inc v Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 940 F2d 699, 704 (DC Cir 1991) (mentioning the agency’s
failure to seek deference for a jurisdictional interpretation, which the Supreme Court had
not yet determined to merit deference).
For a case in which the agency failed to raise Chevron arguments at the lower court,
see Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Erskine, 512 F3d 309, 314 (6th Cir 2008)
(noting, in addition to the forfeiture of Chevron arguments, that the agency’s interpretation was not promulgated formally enough to be accorded deference even if Chevron had
been briefed). Sometimes an appellate court will still entertain a deference argument not
raised at the lower court, only to determine that deference did not apply. See Colorado v
Sunoco, Inc, 337 F3d 1233, 1243 n 4 (10th Cir 2003) (entertaining newly raised deference
arguments because those arguments, first, were not outcome determinative and, second,
could affect proceedings on remand).
74 The law of judicial issue creation is notoriously undefined and discretionary. As
Professor Amanda Frost has put it, some exceptions to the norm are “so broadly worded
as to essentially give courts carte blanche to raise new issues at any time.” Frost, 59 Duke
L J at 461 (cited in note 68). Courts may have separation of powers reasons not to mechanically apply the norm against judicial issue creation when the agency abandons an issue.
When the norm is applied to agencies, it allows agencies to dramatically constrain the
grounds upon which a court can rule. Such a practice would give the agency tremendous
influence over the interpretation of the law while also retaining its executive functions.
The joining of those functions in one administrative body incents the agency to promulgate
vague rules that maximize its discretion when it faces litigation. See id at 484, citing John
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation of
Agency Rules, 96 Colum L Rev 612, 645–54 (1996). For additional normative reasons
courts should bring up Chevron sua sponte, see Part III.D.
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Instead, this Comment looks at whether an agency must seek
Chevron deference in order to receive it.75 It is fair to read the
initial Global Tel*Link opinion as resting on a theory that, to apply the Chevron framework in suits in which the agency is a party,
an agency must have sought Chevron deference. In particular, the
court refused to grant Chevron deference to positions advanced in
an order because “the agency ha[d] abandoned those positions,”76
not because none of the parties presented those positions.
The failure to seek such deference or the intentional abandonment of the arguments for deference is what this Comment
terms “Chevron waiver.” Whether an agency’s Chevron waiver
can prevent the application of the Chevron framework is, like
other threshold questions, a matter for Chevron Step Zero.77 This
Comment therefore evaluates Chevron waiver at Step Zero.78
C. The Mechanics of Chevron Waiver
To waive Chevron, the agency’s litigators must make clear
that they do not seek Chevron deference. They can do this in a
number of ways. They could send a letter to the court intentionally abandoning an argument in their brief or, at oral argument,
they could state that they do not seek Chevron deference.79 They

75 The possibility of Chevron waiver presumes that deference is customarily accorded
to agencies. In other words, it presumes that Chevron is still good law. Yet Chevron is at
risk for erosion or even elimination. Two Supreme Court justices have already signaled
their opposition to Chevron. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v Lynch, 834 F3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th
Cir 2016) (Gorsuch concurring); Michigan v Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S Ct
2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas concurring). The intellectual criticism of Chevron is diverse. See, for example, Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 1187, 1189
(2016) (regarding Chevron as an abdication of the constitutionally vested judicial power);
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F3d at 1153 (Gorsuch concurring) (describing Chevron as conflicting with the Administrative Procedure Act); Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference
to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L J 908, 999 (2017) (disputing the idea that Chevron
is rooted in centuries-old judicial practices); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42
Conn L Rev 779, 784 (2010) (declaring that Chevron has increased inefficiency and confusion).
76 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 408 (emphasis added).
77 See Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 191 (cited in note 3) (defining Step Zero as “the initial
inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all”).
78 See Part II.
79 Agencies also sometimes file amicus briefs in suits that center on statutory provisions the agency administers and for which the agency’s interpretations are usually given
Chevron deference. The case that Chevron deference should not be granted if an agency
fails to assert Chevron deference in an amicus brief is much weaker than when an agency
is a party. Amici generally have a more attenuated stake in a case than a party. To hold
that their briefs (and their briefs’ omissions) should narrow the grounds on which a court
can rule would undermine the American legal system’s principled, longstanding reliance
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could also simply fail to raise Chevron arguments before a lower
court. This latter strategy could be termed “Chevron forfeiture.”
When a party fails to press an argument, it is forfeited; but when
a party voluntarily relinquishes an argument, it is waived.80 It is
usually easier for courts to know an issue has been waived than
that it has been forfeited because it is easier to notice an act than
an omission. But Chevron forfeiture will be nearly as easy for a
court to police as Chevron waiver. Chevron is generally only applicable to rules and orders that were promulgated through certain Chevron deference–signaling procedures, so, by observing
the procedure, the court will know that Chevron could apply.81
Moreover, these procedures force the agency to give reasons for
its statutory interpretation in the public record. So even when the
agency’s litigators do not seek Chevron deference at the beginning
of litigation, the court will have access to a lengthy, published paper trail that includes the reasoned statutory interpretation. A
court that wishes to prevent Chevron waiver would be able to
close the forfeiture loophole by deferring to the previously published interpretation.
Because Chevron must be waived in a court document, the
office with the authority to waive will depend on how Congress
has allocated litigating authority. Only the government actor

on party presentation of issues. So long as one of the parties asserts that Chevron deference is merited—no matter what the agency does—Chevron arguments are not waived.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has considered a case in which the federal agency’s amicus
brief was silent on Chevron deference but one of the parties asserted that Chevron deference should be accorded. See PUD No 1 of Jefferson County v Washington Department of
Ecology, 511 US 700, 728–29 (1994) (Thomas dissenting). Despite the omission, the Court
analyzed the statute under the deferential two-step Chevron standard of review. Id at 712.
That case concerned a state agency’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s certification
requirements. Rather than make a Chevron case for its own interpretation (which favored
the state regulator), the EPA’s amicus brief argued that, even under the petitioners’ interpretation of the statute, the state’s regulation was permissible. Id at 729 n 1 (Thomas
dissenting). The Court nonetheless applied Chevron and deferred to the EPA’s interpretation. Id at 712.
80 See United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is the
failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right.’”), quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 (1938).
81 Courts determine whether Chevron applies by looking to the procedure the agency
used in developing the interpretation. See text accompanying notes 137–45. Though there
is some uncertainty about whether less common procedures trigger Chevron deference,
the two most common “relatively formal” procedures—notice-and-comment rulemaking
and formal adjudication—do trigger Chevron. In fact, the Supreme Court has only ever
extended Chevron to interpretations arising under notice-and-comment rulemaking and
formal adjudication. Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 Fordham L Rev
527, 548 (2014).
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with litigating authority can waive Chevron. As a general matter,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the attorney general are
empowered to conduct litigation in which a federal agency is a
party.82 For cases before the Supreme Court, the attorney general
has delegated litigating authority to the solicitor general.83 Yet
the general grant of litigating authority is rife with exceptions.
Many agencies—both independent and executive—have statutory grants of independent litigating authority, at least at certain
levels of litigation or over certain matters.84 Independent litigating authority is at its apex for the Federal Election Commission
(FEC), which represents itself in all proceedings except before the
Supreme Court,85 and at its nadir for the National Transportation
Safety Board, which has no independent litigating authority.86
Many of the allocations of litigating authority are quite complex.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission, for instance, has independent litigating authority over injunctive actions in the district courts but must have the consent of the attorney general to
conduct its litigation in other cases, except at the Supreme Court,
for which it never has litigating authority.87 In Global Tel*Link,
the FCC was empowered to waive because it has litigating authority over direct appeals from its orders.88 For a different agency
or a different matter, a DOJ lawyer may have the sole authority
to select the litigating position.
Waiver could also occur at each step of the Chevron analysis.
In Global Tel*Link, the FCC retracted its entire argument that it
had authority to regulate intrastate calls, all contained in Section I
of its brief.89 That section contained arguments relevant to each
82

28 USC § 516.
See 28 CFR § 0.20(a).
84 For a helpful chart distinguishing agencies without independent litigating authority from those independent and executive agencies with “[f]ull or [p]artial” independent
litigating authority, see Kirti Datla and Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L Rev 769, 800 (2013).
85 See 26 USC §§ 9010(a), 9040(a); Federal Election Commission v NRA Political Victory
Fund, 513 US 88, 96 (1994). The FEC may represent itself before the Court in the narrow
set of cases involving the presidential election funds. Id at 94.
86 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 Cal L Rev 255, 278 (1994).
87 15 USC §§ 2071(a), 2076(b)(7).
88 See Devins, 82 Cal L Rev at 279 (cited in note 86). The FCC has litigating authority
over appeals from its orders (except before the Supreme Court), but the DOJ handles “actions launched in district court.” Id. FCC lawyers and DOJ lawyers frequently collaborate.
DOJ lawyers were listed on the FCC’s Global*Tel Link brief but not on its letter retracting
Chevron arguments. FCC Brief at *66 (cited in note 41); Jan 31 Letter at *2 (cited in note 34).
89 See Jan 31 Letter at *1 (cited in note 34).
83

2018]

Waiving Chevron

1943

step of the Chevron analysis. The agency abandoned its Step Zero
argument that its interpretations of its own jurisdiction merited
Chevron deference.90 It abandoned its Step One argument that
the statute was ambiguous.91 And it abandoned an elaborate Step
Two argument that its interpretation was reasonable.92 The DC
Circuit treated the abandonment of all three arguments at the
logically primary step, Step Zero, holding that, because the
agency failed to seek deference, the whole of Chevron analysis
would not be applied.
Yet not all Chevron waiver includes all three steps. At each
Chevron step, the agency could withdraw all arguments or stipulate that it disagrees with the deference-friendly view. For example, at Step Zero the agency could make no claims about whether
Chevron deference is merited or it could explicitly state that deference is not merited. Either example would act as a Chevron
waiver. That is, either one would implicate a rule that an agency
must seek deference in order to get it.
Waiver gets more complicated if it inheres at Chevron’s later
steps—and some of the circumstances are beyond the scope of this
Comment. An agency that does not want its regulation to receive
deference could “waive” at Step One rather than Step Zero. It
would agree that the regulation is of the sort that merits the
Chevron framework but either withdraw its argument that the
statute is ambiguous or, more emphatically, argue that the statute unambiguously forecloses the regulation.93 At Step Two, the
agency could argue that the interpretation is unreasonable or
make no argument about reasonableness. One common way in
which an agency “waives” Step Two is by asserting that Chevron
analysis concludes (in the agency’s favor) at Step One. The agency
argues the statute unambiguously demands its interpretation
and thus the agency does not submit Step Two arguments about
the reasonableness of its interpretation. Sometimes, in a move
called Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, the court will decide that
the statute is ambiguous and remand to the agency rather than
apply Step Two.94

90

See FCC Brief at *27 (cited in note 41).
Id at *28.
92 Id at *28–38.
93 An agency cannot, however, argue that the court should defer to its new reasoning.
See Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US 204, 212–13 (1988).
94 Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half doctrine is largely a creation of the DC Circuit. For
a comprehensive discussion of how it operates and when agencies might take advantage
91

1944

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1927

D. The Varieties of Chevron Waiver
This Section describes the circumstances under which we
might expect an agency to try to waive Chevron.95 Because Chevron
increases an agency’s interpretive powers, the more interesting
question is when an agency might be motivated to waive Chevron,
but it’s worth first spelling out the elementary conditions of Chevron
waiver. For one, waiver is a midlitigation action, so there must be
ongoing litigation. Not only that, the agency action being contested must turn, to some extent, on a question of statutory interpretation. It would make no sense to waive Chevron in an arbitraryand-capricious challenge that would never be subject to deferential review under Chevron. Lastly, because Chevron waiver weakens the agency’s position, the agency will waive only when it desires to reverse the action for which it has been sued.
Yet Chevron waiver will not be used every time the agency
wants to reverse its actions. Some agency actions can be undone
more easily and predictably through means other than Chevron
waiver. An agency that uses Chevron waiver must still inform the
court of its waiver, show up for oral argument, and leave the fate
of the agency action in the hands of a judicial panel. It is not particularly onerous, but it is more onerous and more uncertain than
the simple revocation of, say, a guidance document.96 Chevron
waiver is, however, always less onerous—if more uncertain—

of it, see generally Daniel J. Hemel and Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half,
84 U Chi L Rev 757 (2017).
95 Throughout this Section, I will speak of the “agency” as the actor who waives Chevron.
Yet as already noted, a litigator must waive Chevron. That litigator could be an employee
of the agency that promulgated the rule or an employee of an agency within the DOJ, such
as the Office of the Solicitor General or the Civil Division. If a DOJ attorney waives, it
could be at the behest of the promulgating agency or another official within the executive
branch. “Agency” provides a useful simplification, encompassing waiver by the agency’s
counsel and by DOJ lawyers at the behest of the promulgating agency. It also follows from
the Global Tel*Link panel’s emphasis on the agency’s abandonment of the pro-Chevron
position. See Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 408. For the complexities introduced by the division of litigating authority, see notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
96 That is, unless the guidance document is a “significant” guidance document, which
has been subject to interagency review at least since the George W. Bush administration.
See generally Office of Management and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance
Practices, 72 Fed Reg 3432 (2007). A guidance document is significant if it has an effect
on the economy of at least $100 million or “adversely affect[s] in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities”; creates an inconsistency with another agency; “[m]aterially alter[s] the budgetary impact of entitlements,
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof”; or
“[r]aise[s] novel legal or policy issues.” Id at 3439.
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than undertaking the multimonth (or longer) procedures necessary to issue a new rule,97 revoke an old one,98 or, if applicable,
conduct a new adjudication.99
In addition to the different costs to the agency of promulgation and Chevron waiver, there may also be a different reward.
An interpretation that goes through notice and comment generally cannot be rescinded except through notice and comment.100
But a judicial interpretation after Chevron has been waived may
be even “stickier.”101 A judicial decision at Step One rather than
Step Two binds future administrations.102 That is, even after notice and comment, future administrations cannot promulgate an
interpretation that a court has said is unambiguously foreclosed.
For instance, the administration cannot replace an interpretation
that a court has said is the unambiguous command of the statute.
The rule applies whether a court has explicitly resolved the case
at Chevron Step One or determines that the statute is unambiguous even without applying Chevron analysis.103 An agency considering whether to waive Chevron must consider whether the

97

See 5 USC § 553.
See Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 US
502, 515–16 (2009).
99 See 5 USC §§ 554, 556–57.
100 See Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1206 (2015) (explaining
that the Administrative Procedure Act requires that “agencies use the same procedures
when they amend or repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule in the first instance”),
citing Fox Television, 556 US at 515.
101 For a discussion of why agencies would desire “stickier” interpretations rather
than simple flexibility, see Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U Chi L Rev 85, 117–
25 (2018) (“[T]he ability to make credible commitments matters because agencies have
more long-term options if regulated parties trust that agency policies are durable.”).
102 See National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services,
545 US 967, 982–83 (2005).
103 Id at 984–85 (holding that AT&T Corp v City of Portland, 216 F3d 871 (9th Cir
2000), which did not analyze the regulation under Chevron, did not bind the agency because it described its reading of the statute as the best one, not the only permissible one,
implying that its interpretation would have been binding had it said its interpretation was
unambiguously commanded by the statute). See also UC Health v National Labor Relations
Board, 803 F3d 669, 688 (DC Cir 2015) (Silberman dissenting):
98

The first [question Brand X addresses is] how [ ] reviewing courts deal with a
pre-Chevron judicial decision if the agency subsequently disagrees. The Supreme
Court explained that if a prior judicial decision announced the only acceptable
interpretation of a statute that opinion governed, but if the earlier judicial opinion—properly read—only relied on a better interpretation, the agency was free
to adopt a different reasonable construction.
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court is more likely to bind future administrations if it is analyzing the statute under Chevron’s two steps or in their absence.104
It then must consider how confident it is that the court will read
the statute in the way that it now prefers. The best-case scenario
for an agency that wants to reverse a policy is for the court to read
the newly favored interpretation as the unambiguous command
of the statute, binding future administrations. The worst-case
scenario is for the court to bind the agency to an interpretation it
disfavors. If Chevron waiver increases the chances of a binding
judicial interpretation, then waiver is a high-risk, high-reward
choice. Even if Chevron waiver decreases the chances of a binding
interpretation, the agency takes a gamble when it waives because
it relies on the court to reverse a policy it could reverse on its own,
albeit more burdensomely.
No matter whether Chevron waiver increases or decreases
the chances that future administrations will be bound, it is clear
that Chevron waiver arises when the agency tries to reverse a
policy that was promulgated in a binding manner. We can classify
six broad categories of circumstances that would lead an agency
to reverse such a policy. The first two come after a presidential
transition. The next four all involve the same administration
seeking to undo its own policy, distinguishing political from technical motivations and agency-initiated reversals from White
House–initiated ones.
The first scenario is what happened in Global Tel*Link: a
presidential transition changed agency policy while litigation was
ongoing.105 Courts can always avoid the possibility of Chevron
waiver in these instances by holding the case in abeyance until
the new administration determines whether it wants to retract
its rule. But there might be good reasons not to delay argument,
such as the desire for relief for inmate families that the court
found persuasive in Global Tel*Link.106
The presidential transition is especially ripe for Chevron
waiver. Modern congressional gridlock means that the postelection political capital of a new administration must be spent
largely through administrative actions. Such capital has a short
half-life, and so it must be spent quickly. New agency officials,
104 We do not know whether Chevron waiver makes a court any more likely to resolve
the issue at Step One in favor of the agency’s newfound preferences; it’s an empirical question with a very small data set.
105 See generally Jan 31 Letter (cited in note 34).
106 See generally Jan 18 Order (cited in note 35).
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moreover, will seek to change many binding rules but only have
so much latitude to do so, especially if they encounter bureaucratic resistance.107 Chevron waiver is a means of reversing
agency policy that generally imposes fewer costs on the agency
than the alternatives.
A second scenario also follows a presidential transition. In
this scenario, however, litigation begins after the new agency
leadership has taken their role, perhaps tacitly invited by agency
leadership. This is similar to the “sue and settle” practice, in
which an agency invites a sympathetic nongovernmental organization to sue the agency for failing to undertake a regulatory action, which is then mandated by a consent decree. Like Chevron
waiver, “sue and settle” is a means of averting the rigors of notice
and comment or interagency review, the White House’s somewhat
prolonged process for subjecting certain agency actions to costbenefit analysis and otherwise bringing them in line with the administration’s priorities.108
The other scenarios do not involve a presidential transition.
Instead, the same administration has changed its policy. We can
divide these scenarios along two axes: the motivation for the
change and the actor initiating it.
FIGURE 1: EXAMPLES OF INTRA-ADMINISTRATION POLICY
REVERSAL
White
House
Initiated
Agency
Initiated

Politically Motivated
Issue not subject to interagency review becomes
politically controversial.
Agency is heavily lobbied post-promulgation;
priorities of DOJ run
contrary to that of the
promulgating agency.

Technically Motivated
Change to cost-benefit
formula.
New information relevant to action changes
agency’s mind; DOJ has
litigating authority and
is concerned with implications from agency’s
construction of statute.

107 The previous administration will have tried to promulgate rules through notice
and comment, knowing they are hard to rescind. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing:
Entrenching Policies and Personnel before a New President Arrives, 78 NYU L Rev 557,
592–93 (2003).
108 See generally William L. Kovacs, Keith W. Holman, and Jonathan A. Jackson, Sue
and Settle: Regulating behind Closed Doors (US Chamber of Commerce, May 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5MWP-UA4N.
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Agencies are given more leeway to reverse their policies than
are, say, courts following stare decisis because agencies are designed to be able to expertly respond to a changing world and to
be (somewhat) responsive to popular opinion.109 Individual estimations of agencies’ capacity for genuine expertise or genuine responsiveness will differ. Because one might be more solicitous of
agency claims to expertise and less solicitous of claims to responsiveness, or vice versa,110 it’s worth separating out these two factors, at least conceptually. Hence, we should make a distinction
between agency reversals rooted in technical expertise and
agency reversals rooted in policy concerns. In the former, the
agency responds to new evidence coming to light. In the latter,
the agency responds to pressures from the president, Congress,
various interest groups, or even to nontechnical judgments made
by the agency staff itself.
Though we may be able to conceptually separate technical
agency motivations from political agency motivations, in practice
courts are likely to struggle with the distinction. Take, for example, Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp,111 which concerned the agency’s decision to reverse decades
of agency policy and regulate tobacco as a drug. Was this a technical decision motivated by the accumulation of evidence of tobacco’s harmful effects or a political decision under pressure from
both the president and specific lobbies? The answer in Brown &
Williamson is undoubtedly both. The difficulty of separating the
political from the technical is not limited to issues of vast public
consequence.112 One reason is that social scientific techniques often rest on a series of subjective commitments or observations.113
What’s more, political pressures on the agencies have only grown,

109 See Randy J. Kozel and Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA
L Rev 112, 137 (2011). In their article, Professors Randy Kozel and Jeffrey Pojanowski
chronicle the various ways in which administrative policy change is and is not subject to
higher standards of review. Id at 138–59.
110 See Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy
95–105 (Basic Books 1989) (contrasting a Weberian confidence in technically proficient
bureaucracy with the view of The Federalist, which thought that delegating executive responsibility to popular government was the best means to good social policy).
111 529 US 120 (2000).
112 See, for example, Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation,
95 Colum L Rev 1613, 1617 (1995) (referencing the phenomenon of “camouflaging controversial policy decisions as science”).
113 See F.A. Hayek, The Counter-revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason
41–60 (Liberty Fund 1979).
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even on seemingly narrow issues.114 Recognizing the reality of
congressional gridlock, industry and activist groups have devoted
much more attention to influencing administrative outcomes, including through more oblique means, such as public relations
campaigns, lobbying Congress, and ex parte communications.115
Such pressures not only mix the political with the technical, but
they can overpower administrative norms, including, relevant for
our purposes, the norm that agencies adopt litigation positions
that defend their chosen policy.116
Then there is the question of who initiates the policy change.
Frequently, this will be the president, who intervenes and cajoles
the litigator into changing its position, which the agency initially
developed largely without presidential input. President-initiated
waiver is more plausible for low-impact actions that evaded interagency review when they were developed117 but that, upon implementation, attract public attention. Actions that merit the ire of
more sophisticated regulated parties are more likely to attract
presidential attention during the comment phase of the initial
promulgation, so this scenario is probably limited to actions that
affect less sophisticated parties.
The litigator could also initiate the change. Here the question
of litigating authority becomes paramount.118 Chevron could be
waived by an agency with independent litigating authority when
it discovers new evidence, seeks to quietly undermine a presidential priority, or perhaps when the agency’s counsel disagrees with
its technical staff and the agency head tolerates the reversal.
114 See McGarity, 61 Duke L J at 1704–10 (cited in note 9). Professor Thomas
McGarity largely laments this trend and credits much of it to right-of-center groups who
have more foundational disagreements with the regulatory state. Id at 1709–10. But administrative law is unlikely to successfully counter the expansion of the range of viewpoints in our politics. Administrative law must instead adapt to the breakdown of any
technocratic consensus.
115 Id.
116 One possible answer to the question of why agencies have not tried to waive Chevron
before is that the increased pressures on the agencies have eroded the norms that kept
past agencies from so obviously undermining their promulgated policy.
117 Agencies frequently act to insulate themselves from presidential review by opting
to proceed by adjudication, crafting rules that fall just beneath the significance threshold
for interagency review, burying the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
in technical substance, forcing OIRA to review their products under tight statutory deadlines, and seeking out coalition partners among the many staffers who together make up
the White House. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126
Harv L Rev 1755, 1782–1803 (2013).
118 See Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within Agencies, 120
Yale L J 1032, 1060 (2011) (hypothesizing about the incentives created by the inconsistent
allocation of independent litigating authority).
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Chevron waiver when the DOJ has litigating authority, by contrast, could reflect a difference in policy priorities between the expert agency and the attorney general.119 One could even imagine
a situation in which the dispute between the attorney general and
the agency is technical. For example, the agency’s interpretation
of a statute it administers might have implications for how other
statutes are read, compromising administrative priorities. Likewise, in cases before the Supreme Court, the solicitor general
might be torn between his role as a lawyer for the government
and his role as the “Tenth Justice,” the Court’s expert partner in
interpreting the law.120 He might drop Chevron arguments he
thinks are meritless or that would create an undesirable precedent. Alternatively, he might see the president as his client and
undermine the aims of the independent agency.121
With the current sample size of one, it is impossible to know
which actors and which motivations will most often lead to Chevron
waiver or if Chevron waiver is largely a post-transition phenomenon. Returning to Figure 1, we do not know if Chevron waiver is
most likely in the political/White House–initiated, political/agencyinitiated, technical/White House–initiated, or technical/agencyinitiated circumstance. However, we should expect the motivation
and initiating-actor axes to interact. Because the president is generally considered to be more of a political actor than the agencies,
we expect political reversals to be disproportionately provoked by
the president and technical reversals by the agency. Yet that expectation does not exclude the possibility of the opposite scenarios.
The president can also reverse policy for technical reasons—for
instance, the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) can adjust its cost-benefit assumptions—and
agency motivations may be political too. Though we cannot know
which motivations and which actions will most often spark a policy reversal, the combinations of possibilities are common enough
that, if permitted, agencies will from time to time seek to use
Chevron waiver.

119

Id at 1060–61.
See Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General,
21 Loyola LA L Rev 1105, 1106 (1988) (describing different approaches to the solicitor
general’s responsibilities).
121 But see Devins, 82 Cal L Rev at 290 (cited in note 86) (“While the Solicitor General
may seek to moderate the independent agency’s position because of competing agency or
executive interests, he rarely tosses aside the independent agencies’ views.”).
120
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II. CHEVRON WAIVER AND THE STEP ZERO DOCTRINE
A hypothetical doctrine prohibiting Chevron waiver—or alternatively, specifying that an agency must seek Chevron deference in order to be given Chevron deference—would apply at
Chevron’s “Step Zero,” which asks whether a given agency action
is even subject to the Chevron inquiry.122 This Part describes the
major Step Zero cases, which have established a murky doctrine,
and then applies that doctrine, by its own terms, to a situation in
which the agency has abandoned its interpretation in litigation.
As Part II.B explains, the doctrinal formulations of Step Zero do
not resolve the question of Chevron waiver. But building on the
Step Zero cases Part II.A lays out, Part III applies Step Zero’s
deeper intuitions about Chevron and the reasonable Congress to
conclude Chevron deference should not be waivable.
A. Defining Step Zero
Before Chevron, courts relied on a number of factors to calibrate the scrutiny they accorded agency actions.123 The Chevron
opinion, however, appeared to suggest that deference does not
vary with the agency’s persuasiveness.124 Instead, it identified a
category of agency actions that are accorded deference and a twostep test for applying that deferential review.125 And Chevron
122 Note that even “waivers” at Step One or Step Two would apply at Step Zero. An
agency that refuses to argue the statute is ambiguous (Step One Waiver) and an agency
that refuses to argue the interpretation of an ambiguous statute is reasonable (Step Two
Waiver) would take those positions because it does not seek deference. Under a rule that
the Chevron framework cannot be applied when the agency does not seek deference, such
Step One and Two Waivers would bar the application of the Chevron framework—just like
any other agency action that fails Step Zero.
123 See Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 140 (1944) (according deference to agency
judgments depending “upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
124 Chevron, 467 US at 842–43.
125 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 Duke L J 511, 516. See also Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches,
71 Geo Wash L Rev 347, 348 (2003) (“The Chevron opinion itself is best read as an attempt
to simplify and clarify the preexisting, and notoriously muddled, law of deference to agency
interpretations.”). Yet not all have accepted the view that Chevron replaced the Skidmore
deference standard with a Chevron deference rule. As both justice and judge, Stephen
Breyer has taken the opposite view, arguing that Chevron merely added a factor—hypothetical congressional intent—to the multifactor analysis in Skidmore. See Christensen v
Harris County, 529 US 576, 596 (Breyer dissenting). See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 380–81 (1986). As a consequence of this interpretation, Breyer has favored a more standard-like conception of Chevron.
See SAS Institute Inc v Iancu, 138 S Ct 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer dissenting) (describing
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introduced a new justification for deferring to agency interpretations: a construction of congressional understanding.126 Courts
should defer to agency interpretations of statutes because Congress
allocated interpretive authority to the agency.127 Some allocations
provide explicit permission for gap filling, which therefore merits
deference unless “manifestly contrary to the statute.”128 More
commonly, the allocation of interpretive authority is implicit.
Even then, the court cannot substitute its reading of the statute
for the agency’s reasonable interpretation.129
But Chevron offered little guidance for determining which
category of agency actions merited deference.130 It was not clear
whether Chevron deference was tied to the specific procedure that
generated the interpretation or if it depended on whether the interpretation was legally binding.131 Actions taken after more rigorous agency procedures and actions that have the force of law
are not wholly coextensive. Many binding regulations avoid notice

Chevron as “rule of thumb” in the only paragraph of his dissent which Justice Elena Kagan
did not sign). The court has oscillated between these two views. See text accompanying
notes 134–47.
126 See Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), NA, 517 US 735, 740–41 (1996) (characterizing Chevron as justifying deference in “a presumption that Congress . . . understood that
the ambiguity would be resolved . . . by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than
the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows”).
127 Chevron, 467 US at 843–44. See also Scialabba v Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S Ct 2191,
2214 (2014) (Roberts concurring) (“Courts defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of
an ambiguous statute because we presume that Congress intended to assign responsibility
to resolve the ambiguity to the agency.”).
128 Chevron, 467 US at 843–44.
129 Id at 844.
130 Chevron’s one clear limiting principle is that it applies only to an agency’s “construction of the statute which it administers.” Id at 842 (emphasis added). Later courts
have read Chevron to limit deference to agency interpretations of statutes that Congress
charged the particular agency with administering. See Smiley, 517 US at 739. Hence, statutes
that are administered by no single agency, like the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L
No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified at 5 USC § 500 et seq, or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USC § 2000bb–
2000bb-4, are not thought to grant agency interpretations Chevron deference. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Step Zero after City of Arlington, 83 Fordham L Rev 753, 759–60 (2014).
131 See Christensen, 529 US at 587:
Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not
one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.
Christensen, decided a year before Mead, did not specify whether these latter interpretations did not warrant Chevron deference because they were promulgated under less rigorous procedures, or because they lacked the force of law, or both, or neither.

2018]

Waiving Chevron

1953

and comment, whether through the good cause exception132 or by
going through other means of promulgation, such as negotiated
rulemaking.133
Mead seemingly resolved the question of what triggers Chevron
while adding complications of its own. Chevron analysis is
prompted, the Court said, “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”134
Chevron’s Step Zero therefore begins from a construction of the
enacting Congress’s intent. That Congress required “relatively
formal” procedures like notice and comment for agency action is
not dispositive, but it is a “very good indicator” of an intention to
endow the agency with the authority to interpret ambiguities in
the statute with the force of law.135 The force of law inquiry was
presumably emphasized because, when an agency acts with the
same force over private conduct as Congress is capable of when it
exercises its statutory authority, gaps and ambiguities in the
statute could be said to deputize the agency as a kind of junior
legislator.136
Mead did not elaborate much on which clues beyond “relatively formal” procedures suggest congressional intent to endow
the agency with the power to act with the force of law.137 A few
considerations are implicit in Mead’s reasoning. Chevron deference is more plausible when the action (1) has precedential value,
(2) is binding on third parties, (3) is promulgated high in the
132

See 5 USC § 553(b)(B).
See 5 USC §§ 561–70.
134 Mead, 533 US at 226–27. Scholars contest whether Mead posited that “force of
law” is an independent criterion for which agency procedures like notice and comment are
evidence. The opinion is something of a mess, having finessed several views among the
justices to obtain eight votes. See Merrill, 83 Fordham L Rev at 766–67 (cited in note 130).
135 Mead, 533 US at 229–30.
136 See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex L Rev
113, 199–202 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
Georgetown L J 833, 876–79 (2001). But see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86
Notre Dame L Rev 273, 288 (2011):
133

One can read authority to act with the force of law as implying a designation of
interpretive primacy only if one engages in the semantic sleight of hand of equating creating policy within the bounds of the statute with resolving gaps and ambiguities in the statute. But they are not the same. Filling in gaps and clarifying
ambiguities means resolving issues about what the statute requires and prohibits, while creating policy-based rules means adding legal requirements that neither permit what the statute prohibits nor prohibit what the statute requires.
137

See Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 533 (cited in note 81).
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agency hierarchy, or when (4) the volume of actions of the same
type is not too high.138 Justice Antonin Scalia, who had celebrated
the categorical nature of Chevron, denigrated this approach as
“th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”139
The analysis quickly became even less rule-based. A year after
Mead, Justice Stephen Breyer, who had long argued deference
should vary with the circumstances, wrote for the Court in Barnhart
v Walton.140 Barnhart described a five-factor Step Zero test in
which Chevron’s application depends on some combination of
whether (1) the interpretation is “interstitial,” (2) the agency acts
within its expertise, (3) the interpretive question is important “to
administration of the statute,” (4) administration is complex, or
(5) the agency has given the question “careful consideration . . .
over a long period of time.”141 Five years after that, Breyer, again
writing for the Court, laid out a different set of factors.142 As in
Mead, each multifactor test evaluated whether Congress intended to allocate interpretive authority to the agency.143
Though Mead pushed the Step Zero inquiry in a more holistic
direction, with the ultimate focus on whether the agency acted
with the force of law, agency procedure still plays an essential role
in Step Zero. In practice, the lower courts generally extend Chevron
analysis only to the products of notice-and-comment rulemakings

138 See Mead, 533 US at 232–34. See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has
Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand L Rev 1443, 1452–53 (2005).
139 Mead, 533 US at 241 (Scalia dissenting). Scalia proposed instead that all “authoritative” agency interpretations trigger Chevron analysis. See id; Christensen, 529 US at
591 (Scalia concurring). Chevron waiver would be relatively straightforward under the
authoritativeness test. Interpretations that “represent the judgment of central agency
management, approved at the highest levels” are authoritative, including the opinion of
the general counsel for the agency. Mead, 533 US at 258 n 6 (Scalia dissenting). A general
counsel’s declaration that the agency had abandoned the interpretation would probably
mean it was no longer authoritative and thus not subject to Chevron deference. By the
logic of Scalia’s Mead and Christensen opinions, Chevron waiver is likely permissible.
140 535 US 212 (2002).
141 Id at 222.
142 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd v Coke, 551 US 158, 173–74 (2007). Breyer
looked to whether the agency rule “sets forth important individual rights and duties,” the
agency “focuses fully and directly upon the issue,” the agency “uses full notice-and-comment
procedures,” “the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority,” and “the rule
itself is reasonable.” Id.
143 See Barnhart, 535 US at 225 (“[The factors] lead us to read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail
related to its administration.”); Long Island Care at Home, 551 US at 173 (“[T]he ultimate
question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat an
agency’s rule, regulation, application of a statute, or other agency action as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of ‘gap-filling’ authority.”).
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and formal adjudications.144 The Supreme Court, in particular,
pays close attention to procedure. “[P]ost-Mead,” Professor Kristin
Hickman observed that “the Court has never actually extended
Chevron deference to interpretations lacking with notice-andcomment rulemaking or relatively formal adjudication procedures.”145 Moreover, when Scalia had the opportunity to write for
the Court in 2013’s City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communications Commission,146 he eschewed any multifactor inquiry and,
at least in dicta, treated notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication as the triggers for Chevron analysis.147
Cases in which the agency has proceeded by notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication are the easy Step
Zero cases. The agency has proceeded relatively formally and acts
with the force of law, so Chevron analysis is applied. In harder
cases, however, the lower courts often supplement Mead’s forceof-law question by looking to a broader range of factors, merging
or selecting between those factors articulated in Barnhart and
those factors implicit in Mead.148
B. Applying Step Zero
Chevron waiver is most likely when the agency has no less
onerous means of reversing policy. By and large, agency policies
without the force of law can be reversed relatively straightforwardly and agency policies with the force of law can only be reversed through means more onerous than Chevron waiver.149

144

See Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 551 (cited in note 81).
Id at 548.
146 569 US 290 (2013).
147 See id at 307. See also Patrick J. Smith, Chevron Step Zero after City of Arlington,
140 Tax Notes 713, 718 (2013) (suggesting that City of Arlington tacitly replaced Mead’s
multifactor inquiry).
148 For descriptions of how circuit courts have examined the harder Step Zero cases,
see Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 551 (cited in note 81); Bressman, 58 Vand L Rev at
1459–64 (cited in note 138). Though many circuits fight their way through the thicket of Mead
and Barnhart factors when faced with an agency action that is neither a legislative rule
nor a formal adjudication, others find ways to avoid this complex inquiry altogether. See
Daniel S. Brookins, Essay, Confusion in the Circuit Courts: How the Circuit Courts Are
Solving the Mead-Puzzle by Avoiding It Altogether, 85 Geo Wash L Rev 1484, 1496–1500
(2017) (describing Step Zero avoidance as the “norm” in the hard cases). One way of avoiding hard Step Zero cases is to determine that the action fails Step Two and so the court
need not reach the Step Zero question. Id at 1497, citing California Department of Social
Services v Thompson, 321 F3d 835 (9th Cir 2003), and Cook v Food & Drug Administration,
733 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2013). Eventually Global Tel*Link took this tack. See Global Tel*Link,
866 F3d at 417 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion).
149 See text accompanying notes 96–99.
145
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Agencies will thus try to waive deference only when an interpretation has the force of law—the same circumstance in which the
interpretation, under Mead, is entitled to Chevron deference.150
But that an interpretation is entitled to deference does not mean
the agency cannot waive that entitlement. Mead is silent on
whether Chevron is mandatory for such interpretations.151
Chevron waiver is one of those harder cases in which a court
could turn to the factors latent in Mead or enumerated in Barnhart.
But most of the factors bear no relation to the Chevron-waiver
situation. All we know about a theoretical case of Chevron waiver
is that the agency wants to abandon its previous interpretation,
which would usually be entitled to Chevron deference. An interpretation that the agency now wants to reverse may be interstitial, or it may not be. The fact that the agency wants to reverse it
tells us next to nothing about its interstitiality, its complexity, its
foundation in expertise (after all, reversals can have technical or
political motivations), its bindingness, its importance to the administration of the statute, or the volume of actions of a similar
type. Likewise, though the Mead court was more comfortable with
deference if the interpretation came from a higher-ranking official, it is not evident that Chevron waiver empowers or disempowers
higher-ranking officials. A president may urge Chevron waiver to
undermine the interpretation of an agency staffer, but a lawyer
in the Justice Department may also use Chevron waiver to undermine the interpretation of the agency.
Barnhart’s “careful consideration . . . over a long period of
time”152 factor applies to Chevron waiver but still gives little guidance. While the initial interpretation was likely developed
through a procedure like notice and comment that ensured some
care was taken, the agency’s newly preferred interpretation has
no such assurances. Hence, Barnhart may suggest that Chevron
150 With a few independently justified exceptions, such as the major-question doctrine. See note 153.
151 A fine-toothed reading of Mead might suggest an answer. “We have recognized a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment,” Mead says, “in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.” Mead, 533 US at 229 (emphasis added). But it would be too lawyerly to treat this sentence as pronouncing that a
claim of deference is a necessary element of a grant of deference. The Court mentions that
deference was claimed in order to specify that the Court is not granting general deference
to the agency. Rather, congressional authorization to rulemake grants deference for the
resulting rules and congressional authorization to adjudicate grants deference for the resulting orders.
152 Barnhart, 535 US at 222.
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cannot be waived. But all this factor does is suggest that the original interpretation merited deference. When the agency waives, it
is not asking for deference for any alternative interpretation that
may not have been carefully promulgated; it is merely inviting
the court to determine the best interpretation, without deference.
Again we reach the question of whether the Mead and Barnhart
factors entitle an interpretation to deference or make deference
mandatory—a question those cases do not address. Instead of applying Step Zero as a doctrinal test, we need to look to the principles that constructed that doctrinal test in the first place.
III. CHEVRON WAIVER AND THE REASONABLE CONGRESS
The murky tests of Step Zero are a function of its conceptual
ambition. Namely, the Step Zero cases—from Chevron to Mead to
Barnhart—all try to grant Chevron deference when Congress
would intend to allocate interpretive authority to the agency and
withhold Chevron deference when Congress would not.153 Step
Zero focuses on congressional intent because Chevron deference
is justified by a construction of congressional intent.154

153 This includes the “major questions” exception to Chevron’s domain that runs parallel to the Mead doctrine. For a concise description of the major-questions doctrine as a
Chevron Step Zero issue, see United States Telecom Association v Federal Communications
Commission, 855 F3d 381, 418–23 (DC Cir 2017) (Kavanaugh dissenting) (“For an agency
to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly authorize the agency to do so. If a statute only
ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful.”). Notably, in his
United States Telecom Association dissent, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh observes that the
Supreme Court has rooted the major-questions exception in both a nondelegation canon
and in “a presumption that Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself, not
leave those decisions to agencies.” Id at 419 (Kavanaugh dissenting). See, for example,
King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (applying the major-questions exception at
Step Zero and withholding Chevron deference in “extraordinary cases” in which it is implausible “that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation”); Utility Air Regulatory
Group v Environmental Protection Agency, 134 S Ct 2427, 2444 (2014) (“We expect Congress
to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political
significance.’”); Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 267 (2006) (“The idea that Congress gave
the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation in
the CSA’s registration provision is not sustainable.”). See also Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at
370 (cited in note 125) (“Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the
statute’s daily administration.”).
154 See Chevron, 467 US at 865; John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator,
128 Harv L Rev 457, 464 (2014) (explaining that Chevron relies as much on the “reasonable legislator construct” as the Skidmore and Mead doctrines, which explicitly rely on the
construct).
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And not just any Congress. Step Zero is an inquiry into how
a hypothetical reasonable Congress would want to allocate interpretive authority.155 The justices have been remarkably frank that
Chevron deference rests on a “legal fiction” of congressional intent.156 Chevron itself was agnostic on whether Congress intended
to grant the agency policymaking discretion when it left a gap in
the statute, or if the issue slipped Congress’s mind, or if Congress
deadlocked.157 To the Chevron Court, it did not matter. Because
Chevron did not hinge on what the enacting Congress actually
wanted, courts apply Step Zero by making presumptions about
congressional priorities.158

155 See Manning, 128 Harv L Rev at 458 (cited in note 154) (“Every framework used
by the Court for determining the availability of deference has rested on a legal fiction
about presumed legislative intent.”); SAS Institute, 138 S Ct at 1364 (Breyer dissenting)
(stating that courts determine how much interpretive authority Congress intended to give
the agency “by using a canon-like, judicially created construct, the hypothetical reasonable
legislator, and asking what such legislators would likely have intended had Congress considered the question”). For a normative defense of the reasonable legislator framework,
see Merrill and Hickman, 89 Georgetown L J at 872 (cited in note 136). In some recent
opinion judges have focused, at least rhetorically, on the will of the actual Congress rather
than that of the hypothetical reasonable Congress. See, for example, City of Arlington, 569
US at 296, 307 (stating that there is no need to wade into the “murky waters” of congressional intent because Congress legislated against a background rule of agency interpretive
power).
156 Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 370 (cited in note 125). See also Scalia, 1989 Duke L J
at 517 (cited in note 125) (“[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional,
presumed intent.”). For an empirical defense of the Court’s legal fiction, see Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Essay, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 Va L Rev
2009, 2041 (2011).
157 Chevron, 467 US at 865:

Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance
at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so;
perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress
was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each
side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For
judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
158 Sometimes, though, a court has more to work with than just a presumption of
congressional priorities. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2011 codified that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s preemption determinations were to be accorded Skidmore deference rather than the Chevron deference that
would be accorded under the usual application of Step Zero. 12 USC § 25b(b)(5)(A). The
legislative history shows that Congress understood the Skidmore-Chevron background
norm when drafting Dodd-Frank. See Kent H. Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 NYU L
Rev 1, 34 (2015). When Congress explicitly codifies the standard of review for agency actions, courts are not free to select an alternative standard of review. It may be inferred
from the fact that Congress knows how to codify an unwaivable standard of review that
Congress’s failure to so codify is a permission slip for Chevron waiver. There are two problems with that inference. First, codifying Chevron or Skidmore is a relatively new (and not
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With Step Zero’s doctrinal formulations unable to resolve the
question of whether Chevron is waivable or mandatory, it is necessary to look to the deeper intuitions that inform Step Zero—
namely, the reasons we have Chevron at all. This Part describes
the hypotheses about Congress that have explicitly and implicitly
justified Chevron deference and shaped the Step Zero doctrine,
examining whether Chevron waiver vindicates or undermines the
values at stake. After an aside on whether Congress would prefer
a rule- or standard-like Step Zero, it focuses on expertise and accountability, the two traditional justifications made explicit in
Chevron. However, this Part finds that they give only weak, conflicting guidance for Chevron waiver.159 Stronger guidance and
persuasive normative arguments are found in a hypothesis that
is largely derived from the scholarly literature: that Chevron is
justified as a reward for agency thoroughness.160 Because Chevron
waiver undercuts the goods provided by rigorous ex ante agency procedures, this Comment urges its prohibition, a procedure-protecting
rule of law that has echoes in canonical administrative law doctrine.
A. An Aside on Step Zero Rules and Standards
The aim of Part III is to recommend a doctrine to govern
Chevron waiver. Before delving into how the principles underlying Step Zero inform a view of Chevron waiver, it’s worth asking
whether, all else equal, a reasonable Congress would prefer a
more rule-like doctrine or a more flexible standard.
Chevron’s foundations suggest a preference for clearer rules.
Later interpreters have understood the Chevron decision as concretizing the then-existing deference regime in a more easily
administrable across-the-board presumption.161 It makes sense for

yet replicated) legislative tool. Previous drafters may not have imagined that they would
have any use for this tool. Second, the decision to codify a standard of review is a departure
from the background norm. Unless Congress understands the background norm to license
Chevron waiver, the failure to depart from the background norm is not an endorsement of
Chevron waiver. Dodd-Frank, for instance, codified a Skidmore standard in order to depart
from the Chevron norm, not to avert Skidmore waiver.
159 See Parts III.B, III.C.
160 See Part III.D.
161 Most notably, see Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 516 (cited in note 125). It is true that
Justice Breyer does not share this view. For Breyer, a step-by-step Chevron framework is
subordinated to a holistic inquiry into “whether Congress would want a reviewing court to defer
to the agency interpretation at issue.” Nicholas R. Bednar and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Inevitability, 85 Geo Wash L Rev 1392, 1438 (2017), quoting Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev
at 541 (cited in note 81). Breyer does not explicitly address the question of whether the

1960

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1927

Congress to prefer a clear presumption. That way, when Congress
sets out to legislate, it can better anticipate how its legislative
product will be applied and better discharge its constitutional
duty.162 Of course, the desire for clarity that may have motivated
Chevron did not carry over to the Mead and Barnhart Courts.
The clearest lines would be to allow all Chevron waiver or to
blanketly prohibit it. All other concerns aside, blanketly prohibiting Chevron waiver is more easily administrable. If Chevron
waiver is permissible, judges (and legislators) will need to confront a range of thorny questions about who can waive, how, and
when.163
But there are other imaginable lines of relative clarity. Waivers
by one administration in order to undo the interpretations of the
last administration are identifiable and an exception could be
carved out for them, albeit with some difficulty.164 Other more intricate lines are less defensible. It is hard to distinguish between
waivers instigated by one official or another because the lawyer
with litigating authority may waive under instructions from the
president or from various agency officials. Likewise, distinguishing technical rationales from political ones will not be easy because rationales need not be given when omitting an argument
from a brief. Moreover, even if a technical rationale were given, it
could be mere pretext for political motives.

reasonable Congress would prefer a more rule-like or a more standard-like Step Zero because, for Breyer, the standard-like task of imagining the will of the reasonable Congress
is the Chevron analysis.
162 See Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 125) (describing Chevron as creating a “background rule of law”). See also Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 203 (cited in note 3).
163 The “who waives” question relates to the question posed in the scholarly community about whose interpretations merit Chevron deference. See, for example, David J. Barron
and Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S Ct Rev 201, 204 (arguing
that Chevron deference should extend only to those to whom Congress delegates the power
to administer the given statute and only when that delegatee “takes personal responsibility for the decision”); Mead, 533 US at 258 & n 6 (Scalia dissenting) (linking Chevron to
“authoritative” agency interpretations, which come from “central agency management,”
including—relevant to Chevron waiver—the general counsel for the agency). The “how”
question is also difficult: A brief? A letter? Must there be some review by specific agency
heads? And when? Only before oral argument?
164 It is not readily apparent what counts as “post-transition”: Are acting directors
and officials held over from the previous administration counted as part of the new administration and therefore permitted to waive or are they not? Should there be some sort of statute of limitations, prohibiting Chevron waiver some number of days after Inauguration Day?
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B. Agency Expertise
The Chevron opinion offered two main hypotheses for why
Congress left a gap for the agency to fill. The first of these is that
it wanted the more expert agency to fill in the details of the statutory scheme.165 On this account, statutory ambiguities result because Congress has reached the limits of its factfinding and technical sophistication. Congress thereby anoints the agency an
expert, gap-filling junior legislature. The concern with expertise
may have informed Mead’s “force of law” test. Whether the agency
is acting with the force of law is a decent proxy for when Congress
accepts that the more sophisticated agency is acting as a junior
legislature. Likewise, the extent to which the agency’s interpretation is a product of its expertise was one of the Step Zero factors
in Barnhart and was implicit in other factors, such as complexity
and the interstitial nature of the question.166
Some Chevron waivers will be motivated by technical expertise, and some will not. But acknowledging that a court cannot
easily separate out technical waivers from nontechnical waivers
means that we must consider whether a blanket rule against
waiver or a rule allowing waiver is more in keeping with the interest in expertise. On the one hand, waiver may be expertise enhancing because it allows the agency to more easily achieve its
most recent view, and it is assumed that technical knowledge is
cumulative—that we are getting more expert all the time. But on
balance, the interest in expertise probably cuts against Chevron
waiver. An interpretation born of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication is an interpretation that has engaged
with technical arguments, whether presented in comments or
cross-examination.167 A reviewing court cannot be assured that
that interpretation is the more expert interpretation, but it can
be assured that it was developed through a process that at least
attempts to force sober analysis of relevant evidence.168 To allow
165 Chevron, 467 US at 865. See also Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v LTV Corp, 496
US 633, 651–52 (1990) (“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications
behind Chevron deference.”). Of course, expertise does not explain the full shape of Chevron
jurisprudence. A Step Zero largely rooted in expertise would limit Chevron to interstitial,
technical questions rather than more general questions of statutory interpretation on
which we might think the court is expert. This has not been the case.
166 See Barnhart, 535 US at 222.
167 For a broader discussion of the connection between Chevron’s domain and agency
procedure, see Part III.D.
168 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 Fordham L Rev 17, 26 (2001) (“‘Expertise’ is no
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an agency to waive the deference usually given to that interpretation is to subordinate the fruits of an expertise-channeling process to interpretations that could be arrived at in any number of
possible ways, including nontransparent political bidding.
C. Accountability
The Chevron Court also hypothesized that Congress would
choose to let another “political branch” resolve ambiguities when
Congress deadlocked.169 Congress would want courts to grant deference to the agency’s interpretation because it would make that
interpretive process more accountable in two senses. First, Chevron
enhances electoral accountability. The agency, as part of the executive branch, is responsive to the same group—the electorate—
as Congress and thereby engages in the same kind of interestgroup balancing, approximating how Congress would have interpreted the statute. The Chevron opinion considered electoral accountability a feature of its deference regime. The Court admitted
that whoever interpreted these ambiguous statutes would wind
up making “policy choices,” and it thought it more reasonable to
vest that power in the agency, which can “rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy,” than to vest it in
judges, who are less equipped to “reconcile competing political interests.”170 Second, Chevron enhances accountability to Congress.
Congress might prefer to allocate interpretive authority to the
agency because Congress maintains oversight powers and powers
of the purse that can check the agency in ways it cannot check
courts.171 Congress might also think it is better positioned to use
its legislative power to reverse an agency decision than to reverse
a court ruling.172 A doctrine like Chevron, which steers contested

longer a protective shield to be worn like a sacred vestment. It is a competence to be
demonstrated by cogent reason-giving.”).
169 Chevron, 467 US at 865.
170 Id. See also Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 626 (cited in note 74) (“Chevron makes
sense of original constitutional commitments to electoral accountability by presuming that
Congress has selected agencies rather than courts to resolve serious ambiguities in
agency-administered statutes.”).
171 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 Admin L J 269, 282 (1988); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional
Administration, 43 San Diego L Rev 61, 151–53 (2006).
172 See Kmiec, 2 Admin L J at 281–82 (cited in note 171). But see Merrill and Hickman,
89 Georgetown L J at 865–67 (cited in note 136) (expressing skepticism that Chevron promotes accountability to Congress).
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policy disputes from courts to agencies, will magnify congressional influence over policy and thereby be appealing to the reasonable legislator.173
Each sense of accountability finds some grist in Mead. When
Mead tied deference to the rank of the agency official rendering
the interpretation, it granted more deference to the agency actors
most responsive to the democratically elected president.174 And by
broadly linking deference with agency proceedings that are more
public in nature, Mead encouraged agencies to put Congress on notice of its actions.175 The most visible agency actors and agency actions are the most accountable to the electorate and to Congress.176
As with the expertise factor, accountability gives support for
each side of the Chevron waiver question. Here a reviewing court
must separate out the varieties of Chevron waiver. Waiver following
a presidential transition enhances electoral accountability because
it enables the newly elected coalition to more easily pursue its
aims.177 Likewise, post-transition waiver enhances accountability
173 All this assumes that the reasonable legislator is motivated to maintain his or her
authority over policy choices. But the reasonable legislator may not be a civic republican.
Modern legislators often (rationally) prefer to punt the many lose-lose choices legislators
face. Congress’s determination to avoid politically risky choices and to please all comers
may in fact be the root of much of the statutory ambiguity Chevron addresses. See Morris
P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?,
39 Pub Choice 33, 46–52 (1982).
174 See Mead, 533 US at 233–34.
175 See Beermann, 43 San Diego L Rev at 152–53 (cited in note 171) (supporting the
Chevron framework “when there are likely to be good channels of communication between
Congress and the agency,” opposing Chevron “when there are not,” and showing how recent Supreme Court decisions cohere with this dichotomy).
176 Like expertise, accountability cannot fully explain Chevron’s domain. Article III
courts are less democratically and congressionally accountable than agencies, judges are
harder to remove than agency heads, and all deference shifts interpretive authority from
the courts to the more accountable agency. A solely accountability-based Step Zero would
therefore maximize deference. Step Zero may not take this shape in part because, as an
absolute matter, neither courts nor agencies are very accountable. Each was designed to
be insulated from certain popular pressures, as Chief Justice John Roberts elegantly argued in his City of Arlington dissent. See City of Arlington, 569 US at 313–14 (Roberts
dissenting).
177 There are a few problems with appealing to a popular mandate to justify waiving
Chevron. For one, administrative law generally does not grant procedural exceptions to new
administrations on account of their newness. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
of the United States, Inc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 57
(1983). In addition, one wonders whether there will be much of a popular mandate to pursue a given interpretation of a statute, especially if the major-questions limitation on
Chevron is otherwise in place. See note 153. The question of which policy proposals are
given a popular mandate is almost always unanswerable, but low-salience ones that did
not come up in the campaign—like reversing rate caps for inmate calling services—seem
especially unlikely to have secured popular approval.
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to Congress because Congress can only oversee the new administration and not the old one. Outside the presidential transition
context, Chevron waiver probably undermines accountability.178
The notice-and-comment process generates opportunities for control by the political branches. It alerts Congress and the regulated
parties to the pending action and often requires coordination with
the president and OIRA.179 There is therefore some assurance that
the interpretation Chevron waiver undermines—the interpretation generated by notice and comment—is the product of consultations with elected officials and their closest advisors.180 There is
no such assurance that the decision to waive Chevron, which can
be made by a general counsel for an agency with independent litigating authority, is made in coordination with elected officials.181
Congress’s interest in agencies abiding by procedures that
alert Congress to pending actions presumes that Congress expects
to be able to conduct meaningful oversight. But what if Congress
has a lower estimation of its own powers? Congress may not expect
it will be able to meaningfully oversee the agencies, given the sophistication of the agency’s actions and the collective action problems inherent in a legislative body.182 In that case, a reasonable

178 And perhaps also within the post-transition context. Congress set up a procedure
by which a new administration, along with Congress, may repeal some of the last work of
the past administration. See Congressional Review Act, Pub L No 104-121, 110 Stat 868
(1996), codified at 5 USC § 801 et seq. Chevron waiver may supplement the Congressional
Review Act in ways that run contrary to the limited reversal power authorized by the Act.
179 See McNollgast, Political Control of the Bureaucracy, in Peter Newman, ed, The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 50, 54 (Macmillan 1998) (describing
the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures as performing a “fire alarm” function).
180 For a broader discussion of the connection between Chevron’s domain and agency
procedure, see Part III.D.
181 There may be a way to ensure that Chevron can be waived only when done in
consultation with some elected or high-ranking officials. Litigators who waive Chevron
could describe the directive to waive, and courts could be more solicitous of waivers directed by a presidential appointee or the president himself. That said, Congress might still
be wary that this means of changing policy does not ensure consultation with the right
elected officials. In particular, unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking, neither a directive
from a high-ranking official nor a description of that directive submitted to the court would
alert Congress to the change in policy.
182 Professors David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran have developed a transactioncosts model for congressional delegation. As a general matter, Congress delegates issues
to the agencies when it is unable to overcome its inherent collective action problems. The
result is that agencies are given authority over the precise issues that Congress is least
able to act on. Epstein and O’Halloran conclude that we should also have low expectations
for Congress’s ability to collectively oversee these agencies, given that the agencies handle
matters over “which congressional policymaking is most prone to failure.” David Epstein
and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy
Making under Separate Powers 74 (Cambridge 1999). But see Brian D. Feinstein, Congress
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Congress would oppose Chevron waiver—even after a presidential transition. If Congress cannot meaningfully oversee an
agency, Congress may prefer procedures that force the agency to
submit to comments from the interested parties, who will approximate the sort of pressures a less hamstrung Congress could bring
to bear.
On net, therefore, a reasonable Congress interested in accountability would oppose Chevron waiver. If there is an exception, it is for the post-transition waiver, but the case for the posttransition waiver relies on a few suspect premises: that the people
gave a mandate to pursue the new interpretation,183 that Congress
believes it can meaningfully oversee the agencies, and that a posttransition exception is easily administrable.184 The next factor further weakens the case for the post-transition carve out.
D. Rewarding Rigorous Agency Procedures
Step Zero links the agency’s chosen procedure and the deference the agency is accorded, though that relationship may not be
one-to-one. Asking about agency procedure is frequently the first
step in the reviewing court’s Step Zero analysis,185 but actions that
do not follow relatively formal procedures can still be accorded
Chevron deference.186 Put another way, though the procedure the
agency used cannot predict the whole of Chevron’s domain, the
procedure can predict much of it.
There are static and dynamic reasons why a hypothetical
Congress might want Chevron deference to be the reward for rigorous agency procedures. Statically, the Congress might think
that agency output is superior on an array of criteria when the
agency follows more formal procedures.187 Dynamically, Congress

in the Administrative State, 95 Wash U L Rev 1187, 1232–37 (2018) (demonstrating that
oversight hearings are powerful tools for checking administrative agencies).
183 See note 205.
184 For some concerns about the administrability of a presidential-transition exception, see note 164.
185 See Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 550 (cited in note 81) (“[M]any circuit courts
in practice seem quite simply to extend Chevron review to the notice-and-comment regulations and formal adjudications mentioned in Christensen and Mead.”). Step Zero may be
even more closely tied to agency procedure post–City of Arlington. See text accompanying
note 147.
186 See, for example, Mylan Laboratories, Inc v Thompson, 389 F3d 1272, 1279–80
(DC Cir 2004); Fournier v Sebelius, 718 F3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir 2013).
187 See text accompanying notes 167–68 and 179.
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might want to incent agencies to take on these procedures, in effect awarding an agency’s ex ante scrupulousness with ex post
deference.188
An emphasis on ex ante procedures can be justified through
fuller conceptions of the Chevron rationales discussed above.189
For one, the procedures may enhance expertise. A reviewing court
may be more confident that the agency acted according to its expertise because it went through the discipline of responding to the
comments of interested parties or the arguments presented in the
adversarial adjudicatory process. An appeal to the expert reputation of the agency is not as persuasive as an appeal to the demonstrated thoughtfulness of the agency. Likewise, a fuller picture of
accountability can justify an emphasis on ex ante procedures. If
accountability is about responsiveness to stakeholder voices, not
just those expressed through elections, then administrative procedures can be accountability enhancing. Professor Jud Mathews
has argued that giving those impacted by a decision input in the
decision-making is a means of ensuring “non-domination,” a foundational democratic principle.190
Congress might also favor more formal agency procedures because agencies who engage in these procedures act more “legislatively.” Notice-and-comment rulemaking and adjudication simulate multiple functions of federal lawmaking. For instance, notice
of the potential for regulation is given to impacted parties well
before the regulation is finalized, a procedure akin to the legislative requirement that bills be introduced in committee.191 Moreo-

188 Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 225–26 (2006) (cited in note 3) (describing the results of
Mead as giving the “pay me now or pay me later” choice—that is, choose the constraints of
procedure or those of more searching judicial review). See also Perez v Mortgage Bankers
Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia concurring) (noting that the APA excluded certain actions from notice-and-comment rulemaking under the assumption that
they would be subject to de novo judicial review). But see generally Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Preenforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 Ohio St L J 85 (1997) (defining some circumstances under which postenforcement review is superior to ex ante notice-and-comment
review).
189 See notes 167–68 and 178–81 and accompanying text.
190 See Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 Admin L Rev
605, 637–40 (2016). The consequence of Mathews’s emphasis on “non-domination” is that
the intensity of the review should vary with the adequacy of the agency procedure. Deference is accorded when the agency “adequately took into account the interests of those affected by its decision,” but more scrutiny is applied when the agency did not. Id at 645–46.
191 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 Harv L Rev 1511, 1559–60 (1992).

2018]

Waiving Chevron

1967

ver, the regulation itself is shaped slowly, giving space for legislative ideals of deliberation and careful consideration.192 In this
vein, Mead hailed notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
adjudication for fostering “fairness and deliberation.”193
If deference is the reward for agency procedural rigor, courts
should be especially suspicious of Chevron waiver. A midlitigation
policy reversal does not require that the agency genuinely respond to the technical concerns of affected parties as it did when
it initially formulated the interpretation. Likewise, the failure to
include those parties in the midlitigation reversal subverts the
way notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication
give affected parties the chance to be heard, ensure that they will
consent to the outcome because they respect the integrity of the
process, and encourage the agency to act in ways that resemble
congressional deliberation. Chevron waiver breaks the desirable
link between procedure and deference, allowing the agency to bypass the hurdles Congress set in the path of a rule’s rescission.
The concern is the same whether the agency seeks to change policy after an election or not. Chevron waiver thus runs contrary to
one of the significant intuitions underlying Chevron, an intuition
that has helped shape much of the Step Zero doctrine.
When we step back from the doctrinal tests, which were constructed by courts not anticipating the possibility of Chevron

192 See id at 1541–62. A preference for slow and deliberate lawmaking is deeply rooted
in American constitutional theory. See Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The
Majority Principle in Republican Government, in Robert A. Goldwin and William A.
Schambra, eds, How Democratic Is the Constitution? 102, 105–11 (AEI 1980). Slow and
deliberate lawmaking may enable expertise by facilitating a genuine contest of ideas and
setting a stumbling block before knee-jerk proposals, but it has other virtues too. In particular, slow, deliberative government yields consent, legitimacy, stability, and social
peace. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 15–18 (Yale 1975).
193 Mead, 533 US at 230. But a reasonable Congress might not be so sanguine about
these procedures, which may give little guarantee of efficient results, solicitous regulators,
or genuine deliberation. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke L J
1490, 1492–93 (1992):

No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki
theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues.
See also Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 Ohio St L J 237, 269
(2014) (chronicling some of the defects in notice-and-comment rulemaking that reduce legitimacy and efficiency). Even if these procedures do not fully guarantee a given set of
ends, they offer more guarantees than a procedure-free alternative like Chevron waiver.
Elliott and Nielson argued for more rigorous procedures, not less.
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waiver, and look to the principles that led to those tests, it becomes apparent that Chevron waiver should not be permitted.
Step Zero is informed and shaped by a series of principles: expertise, accountability, and procedural values. Neither expertise nor
accountability gives firm guidance as to whether Chevron deference is mandatory or optional, but the interest in rigorous agency
procedures does. If one weighs these principles evenly, the interest in rigorous procedures—by virtue of being the only principle
that strongly comes down either for or against Chevron waiver—
should control the issue.194 But the case can be made even more
strongly.
Not only is the interest in rigorous procedures the tiebreaking factor; it should be thought of as the foremost factor. For one,
the procedural rationale for Chevron secures the other rationales.
It is through ex ante procedures like notice and comment that observers can be more sure agencies are bringing their expertise to
bear, are coordinating with the political branches, and are alerting individuals who have something at stake in the pending action. Congress’s interest in these procedures subsumes many of
the other reasons for Chevron. It also provides justifications of its
own. In particular, these procedures vindicate an idea of democratic legitimacy that is more comprehensive than electoral accountability or congressional oversight.195
The assertion that Chevron deference is so deeply tied up
with rigorous agency procedures that, once an interpretation has
gone through those procedures, deference should be mandatory
may strike the careful reader as an odd assertion. After all, Mead
came on the heels of Christensen v Harris County,196 which suggested a rule tying deference to procedure and another rule tying
deference to “force of law.”197 Mead explicitly chose “force of
law.”198 The contention in this Comment is not that an agencyprocedure test is a perfect substitute for the many Step Zero tests
but rather that the reasonable Congress’s interest in agency procedures explains a good deal of the shape of those Step Zero tests
194 Note that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, though a choice to not present a Chevron
argument, does not face these normative problems. Whereas Chevron waiver is always a
departure from the reasoning at promulgation, litigating positions that trigger Step-Oneand-a-Half generally follow from the reasoning at promulgation. See note 94; Hemel and
Nielson, 84 U Chi L Rev at 765–71, 779–81 (cited in note 94).
195 See text accompanying notes 189–94.
196 529 US 576 (2000).
197 See note 131.
198 See notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
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and, more to the point, helps explain the question those tests don’t
address: whether deference is mandatory.
It would not be unprecedented to require deference in certain
circumstances, whether the agency seeks it or not. Administrative law is willing to constrain an agency’s choice of litigating positions for the sake of the constitutional structure. Most notably,
the rule of Securities and Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp199
forbids a court from reviewing an agency’s post hoc rationalizations.200 Put another way, judicial review is limited to the grounds
articulated when the action was taken. Chenery I has a Chevron
corollary, Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital,201 which clarified that Chevron deference is given only to statutory interpretations articulated when the agency took the action, not to subsequent “convenient litigating position[s].”202 There are many
principled explanations for Chenery I, but Professor Kevin Stack
has persuasively rooted Chenery I in functional constitutional
concerns.203 He contends that Chenery I ensures many of the aims
of the reasonable Congress. By forcing the agency to give its reasons upfront lest they be disregarded by a reviewing court,
Chenery I ensures that the agency has exercised its expertise and
that politically accountable officials have accepted the agency’s
rationale.204
Applying Chenery I to the question of Chevron waiver poses
the question of just what Chenery I held. If it merely forbade the
review of post hoc rationalizations, Chenery I does not help us
think through Chevron waiver. Chevron waiver is a post hoc removal of the initial reasoning, not a new rationalization. But under Stack’s justification of Chenery I, the rule is not simply about
post hoc rationalizations. Rather, one could restate Chenery I as
the proposition that a court must limit its review to the reasons
the agency offered when the action was taken.205 If we apply this

199

318 US 80 (1943) (“Chenery I”).
Id at 94. See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 419
(1971) (“‘[P]ost hoc’ rationalizations . . . have traditionally been found to be an inadequate
basis for review.”); State Farm, 463 US at 50 (“[A]n agency’s action must be upheld, if at
all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”).
201 488 US 204 (1988).
202 Id at 213.
203 See generally Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116
Yale L J 952 (2007).
204 See id at 993–98.
205 It is not surprising that courts have focused on “post hoc rationalizations.” Agencies more often find creative new ways to defend their policy, not creative new ways to
200
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broader construction of Chenery I to the question of Chevron
waiver, then Chevron waiver is prohibited. A reviewing court
would limit itself to the agency’s original reasoning—including its
expected deference—and not yield to clever, post hoc litigating positions. The prohibition on Chevron waiver could thus be justified
as an application of the long-standing Chenery I rule, or, at the
very least, is rooted in the same concern that agencies not evade
the requirement to rigorously give their reasons before acting.206
CONCLUSION
In an age of high-stakes, high-pressure administration,
Chevron deference is front and center. Rooted in a recognition
that Congress generally prefers that the agency, rather than the
court, have the authority to interpret ambiguities and fill gaps in
a statute, Chevron has only raised the stakes of agency action.
The Global Tel*Link case floated a new possibility for Chevron
deference: whether the court can apply the Chevron framework
when an agency does not seek it. If Chevron waiver is permissible,
there are many circumstances in which an agency will seek to use
this new tool: before or after presidential transitions, under pressure from the president or on its own accord, for technical or political reasons. In all cases, an agency will waive Chevron because
it wants to speedily reverse a position arrived at through some
legally binding process.
undermine it, so courts may have trouble imagining evasions of the agency’s initial rationale that are not post hoc rationalizations.
206 Late in this Comment’s publication process, the DC Circuit issued an opinion that
affirmed the reasoning presented here. In a copyright opinion written by Judge Sri Srinivasan
and joined by Judges Judith W. Rogers and Thomas B. Griffith, the court held that an
agency’s failure to invoke Chevron in its briefing does not forfeit the right to Chevron deference. SoundExchange, Inc v Copyright Royalty Board, 2018 WL 4440299, *8–9 (DC Cir).
Chevron analysis instead depends on whether the “agency manifests its engagement in
the kind of interpretive exercise to which review under Chevron generally applies—that
is, interpreting a statute it is charged with administering in a manner (and through a
process) evincing an exercise of its lawmaking authority.” Id at 9. Not only can Chevron
analysis be applied when the agency fails to raise Chevron at litigation, the agency is not
even required to cite to Chevron during its decision-making. Id. What matters is the process the agency used.
The court’s rule seems to have been shaped by a fear that too much would depend upon
the quality of the agency’s lawyers. A rule requiring agency lawyers to brief Chevron arguments would tend toward a cumbersome “magic words” requirement. Id. And “[a]fter
all, ‘it is the expertise of the agency, not its lawyers,’ that ultimately matters.” Id. But why
should a court be more concerned about the potential for poor agency lawyering to alter
regulatory outcomes in the Chevron context than in any other? This Comment offers one
rationale: that Chevron, like Chenery I, is a judicial rule meant to privilege and incent a
rigorous and complete agency decision-making process.

2018]

Waiving Chevron

1971

As a possible new threshold inquiry before the Chevron
framework is applied, Chevron waiver would inhere at Step Zero.
Step Zero is an imprecise body of doctrine, and its doctrinal formulations neither prescribe, imply, nor prohibit the possibility of
Chevron waiver. The doctrinal confusion results from the Court’s
underlying aim. Namely, the Court seeks to apply deference in a
way that vindicates Chevron’s purposes, particularly those purposes the Court can ascribe to a hypothetical reasonable Congress
that had a reason for leaving ambiguity in the statute for the
agency to resolve.
The reasons for Chevron deference caution against allowing
Chevron waiver. If Chevron waiver is tolerated, agencies can more
easily undo policies arrived at through relatively formal procedures. But we have Chevron deference in large part because
courts assume a reasonable Congress wants more expert, accountable agencies to fill in statutory ambiguities while following
certain procedures. These procedures—which Chevron waiver
would directly undermine—help ensure that the agency actually
wrestles with technical arguments, more fully deliberates, alerts
Congress and individuals to a pending action, works with elected
officials, and provides a basic opportunity for individual participation in the decision-making. Chevron waiver erodes the practical reasons for having Chevron deference at all.

